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ORGANISATION AND REPRESSION IN THE TRANSITIQN TO CONFRONTATION
THE CASE OF KAGISO, 1985-19B6
Jeremy Seek ings
Summary
Thicj paper f r»rue»sef? nn the e^pRrienrp of Kagiso.. a mffdium-"! zed township PV>
t.h*» We»<-.t- Pand - Kagi^o was one o-f "several major townships - Soweto and
Marfieiodi. were* others - which remained relatively 'quiescent' during 1984-
BS, to erupt into mass protest and violent conflict in 4985-86. An
explanation of the development of township politics in Kagiso must take
into account the role of regional and national organisations (in particular
the UDF> and events, ie precisely those factors which underlie
conspiratorial interpretations of ^unrest' in South Africa's townships.
This paper seeks to explain how regional factors impacted on local township
politics, contributing to the latter's transformation.
In the case of Kagiso, regional factors impacted on township politics
through a consumer boycott. The impetus for a boycott came from two
related sources1 first* from local leaders links with the UDF and the
regional consumer boycott initiatives; secondly, from the poorly organised
and sporadic militancy of the so-called 'youths Without adequate prior
organisation in the township, the consumer boycott was initially brutally
enforced by the *youth'. Furthermore, the aims of the boycott were
unclear. The boycott was thus potentially very divisiver
In fact, however, the boycott led to the formation of an unprecedented
political community in Ksgiso, with massive popular support for the
'radical' township organisations. This was largely unintended. Two
factors, interacting with each other, contributed to this. First, the
organisations, responded to the problem of boycott enforcement by
tH^cipi ining the offenders and instituting a general ^crime-prevention*1
campaign. Secondly, the- state responded to intensified protests (many of
which were undoubtedly violent, although limited and directed against
property rather than lives) with very brutal repression. The socially-
useful activities of th<? ^radical;1 organisations combined with the
alienating brutality of the police to mobilise residents into an
unprecedented., albeit very fragile, political community.
Introduction
Between 1984 and 1986 most of South Africa's black townships experienced
chronic and often violent protests and confrontations, and there was rapid
growth in popular support for ^progressive' extra-state organisations.
Events in remote townships like Lingelethu <Cradock), Tumahole (parys),
Ouduza (Nig^i>, and Bongolethu <Oudtshoorn> were reported on the front page
of the national* and even international* press.
The apparent coincidence of protest and confrontation in so
geographically dispersed townships was fertile ground for the prpiif©ration
o-f nation-wide conspiracy analyses C13* The bottom line of such analyses
is that ^waves' of *unrest* were orchestrated by ^agitators', who wpra part
of a conspiracy based around the <then> banned AISC and SACP. The scale o*
their claims was not matched, however, by either analytical rigour or
empirical content. In particular* they failed to either demonstrate the
mechanisms by which the alleged "wave of unrest' was directed, or explain
how and why protests involved different groups of township residents, at
different times, and in different activities.
Much recent research has, in contrast, to the nation-wide conspiracy
analyses, focussed on the specific experiences of individual townships or
areas, and has. emphasised the importance of locally-specific political
dynamics. As most studies focus on individual areas or township* they
often dp not address the broader question of why similar developments are?
occurring in diverse places. Implicitly, however* and sometimes
explicitly* the coincidence of similar processes is explained primarily in
terms of their shared experience of general structural phenomena rather
than any overarching organisation. In many townships in the pretoria.-
Witwatersrand-Vaal <pfw\v% ) region during 1984, for example, widely-shared
factors included rent increases, discontent with township councillors, and.
specific educational grievances-
Townships' experiences of conflict varied considerably* however. Three
majpr p.w.v. townships - Soweto, Kagiso, and Mamelpdi - saw little protest •
or confrontation, at least in comparison with the surrounding townships,
until late 198?, The relatively late transition from apparent ^quiescence'
to confrontation in these townships requires an analysis with a rather
different emphasis. In particular, greater attention has to be paid to the
regional or national dynamics, ie precisely those dynamics which underlay
conspiracy theories of the nation-wide *unrest'.
This paper focusses pn the experience of Kagiso, a medium-sized township or.
the West Rand. It seeks to explain how regional factors impacted on local
township politics, contributing to the latter's transformation- In
particular, i try to show how a consumer boycott (a regional-cum-national
initiative) generated organisational responses which combined with brutal
state repression to mobilise residents into an unprecedented, albeit
•fragile, political community.
The primary source for the paper are the affidavits, record and extensive
documentary exhibits in a 1986 court case, which involved an application by
the Krugersdorp Residents Organisation <KRO) for an interdict restraining
the police and SADF, who KRQ alleged were engaged in a campaign of brutal
harassment of the residents of Kagiso and the nearby township of
Munsievnie. Legal records, even when as extensive as in this case, cannot
provide ar adequate picture. They have therefore been supplemented by a
series o* interviews in 1989-90, There ars gaps in the interviewing which
must be pointed out. First, my interviews have been with people who have
been involved in political organisations, to varying extents, and not with
the proverbial passenger in the Kagiso combi-taxi. Secondly, I have not
interviewed members of the ponce.
Kagiso: Some Background
Kagiso is a medium-sized township south of Krugersdorp on the West Rand.
It has been administered together with the older and very much smaller
location of Munsieville, north-west of Krugersdorp. In March 1984 their
combined official population was over 57,000, of whom almost bU.OOu lived
in Kagiso. The population was evenly divided between adults and children,
and men and women [2]. As of the end of 1984 there were 5,705 houses and
sixteen schools (including two secondary schools). Just over half of the
houses in Kagiso had been built in the late 1950s and early 1960s. About
300 were bui it in Kagiso Extension in 19/9, and three further schemes were
undertaken in 1982-83, comprising over 2,000 houses and including a small
luxury development. By 1984-85 housing in Kagiso thus included an
unusually high proportion of recently-built houses [3]. This was to have
important effects on organisation in the township.
Employment in Kagiso has been dominated by manufacturing enterprises in the
immediately neigbouring Chamdor industrial area, and to a lesser extent in
the Luipardsvlei area. Unions were slow to organise in this areas,
however, and had little impact by 1985. The CUSA/NACTU-affluatea Food and
Beverage Workers Union (FBWU) and Ifrom 1983) the UDF-affi1iated General
and Allied Workers Union (GAWU) organised in some plants.
The most important civic organisation in Kagiso was the Krugersdorp
Residents Organisation 1KRO), originally formed in 1981 at aoout the same
time as a number of other civic organisations in the region. The impetus
to form KRO came from the general recognition, by several different groups
of residents, of the need for a civic organisation. The particular factor
that precipitated the formation of KRO in early 1981 was a rumoured rent
increase. KRO's social or class character broadly reflected that of the
township. The leadership comprised both nationalist-oriented and
relatively intellectual individuals, and more civic-oriented, often church-
based, people. It included individuals with Charterist and non-Chartenst
ideologicaI leanings.
Between February 1981 and March 1983 KRO engaged in a series of single-
issue campaigns. The more important of these were against rent increases
(February/March 1981), Republic Day (May 1981), the building of a new
hostel (mid 1981 ), further rent increases (August 1981 ), and sti i I further
rent increases (October 1982 through to March 1983).
During 1983-84 KRO lapsed into inactivity, broken only by very limited
organisation against the elections for a village Council in November 1983.
The main reason for this inactivity was repression, which removed most of
the leadership for long periods. But repression only paralysed the
organisation because KRO's structures were weak: KRO had focussed too much
on single issue campaigns rather than on organisation-building. The KRO
constitution provided for the formation of sub-committees, but these were
not set up. Even very sympathetic resdents were not drawn into regular
organisation. The extension of the township during 1982-1983 posed
additional organisational problems which KRO failed to address. KRO's
strength was in the older sections, and it failed to broaden its support
base much after the 1981 rent campaigns. [4]
6ppacent--QuiB5cenceii_1984_tQ_»id-12B5
Curing 1984-1985 many townships in the PiW.V. experienced protests over
rent increases, educational issuer* and township councils. During this
time ther*? was relatively little protest in Kagiso* less even than in
nearby Sowefco, or M*melodi (east of Pretoria), There werp probably twp
rel atpd reasons for this. First/ whilst Kagiso residents had numerous <and
typical) grievances, these lacked the specific foci around w*ich broad inass
popular action crystallised or could be mobilised. Thus, whilst the
quality o* housing* township services, and education was widely seen as
unacceptable* there were no rent increases during 1984-1985 to galvanise
opposition, and it does not seem that age-limit were strictly enforced in
school 5,
Secondly, extra-state organisation in the township was still weak* as it
slowly revitalised itself after a period of inactivity. This
talisation during 1984 and early 1985 involved the reorganisation of
and youth structures, and incorporation into regional and national
K^giso had had one of the more active COSAS branches during J9V3-19BI -
although at that time even COSAS strongholds were not particularly strong.
But the f1ight of leading student activists into e^ile had led to the
breakdown of the organisation! The remaining students were strongly
advised against militancy by the teachers, many of whom had been among
those relatively conservative students who had not participated in boycotts
in 1976--78 C51, The absence of an active COSAS branch during 1984 was an
important factor in Kagiso's ^quiescence*1
 e In townships such as TeM>isa.
and Daveyton on the East Rand. COSAS had played a major role in connecting
discontented students with protesting students elsewhere, especially from
Atteridgeville. In 1984-1985 KRO leaders began to help rebuild student
organisation.
At about the same time KRO was drawn into regional and national political
organisation. In August 1984 the KRO chairman. Isaac Genu, returned from
Robben Island. He had been convicted of membership of the ANC and
sentenced to eight years in August 1983, but was later acquitted on appeal
in the Supreme Court- Genu became a key figure in the UDF on the West
Rand, In October 1984 a UDF West Rand Area Committee was established,
including Genu as chairman, with two other KRO committee members as
treasurer and secretary C63, In addition, former Kagiso priest Frank
Chjkane, who had moved to Soweto in 1982, was a vice-president of the
Transvaal UDF from 1983 to 1985. These regional links were strengthened
during early 1985, with some KRO leaders well connected to Soweto-based
activists involved in planning the celebration of International Youth Year,
The revival of organisation in Kagiso was marked by the holding of a public
meeting in November 19B4* and a workshop organised with the UDF in December
1984. Put township organisation, although revived* remained weak. At a
KRO Committee meeting on 3 March 19S5 reports were given on two previous
^public' meeting?, A women's meeting had taken place 'as scheduled but the
attendance was not satisfactory' (according to the minutes); it was
recommended that "Sister Bernard should coopt some women', A housing
seminar had not even taken place 'due to lack of attendance' C73. This
situation Continued1 in May. 200 people were invited to a workshop to look
into the Inter-national Youth Year, sut only eleven attended. C8]
Thi*5 organisational weakness was acknowledged by KRO leaders in several
remarkably frank self-analyses in early 1985. One such analysis was made
at. * KRO Committee meeting In May 1985. It listed KRO's strengths as
f ol 1
t. KPQ enjoys support from the residents and this has been proved
hy attendance at mass meetings;
2. it js obvious that people know of the existence of KRO and
that, it is in their minds;
3, W P don't have a language problem in our area and at committee
a, k'RQ h-as the potential of becoming an effective organisation.
But, under ^weaknesses-1 * it listed the foil owing:
1. Some people do not contribute anything in our meetings;
?,< Pamphlets produced to be distributed among our people dp not
reach their destination;
3. Resolutions taken at mass and committee meetings &re not
carried out by the committee;
4. We tend to talk too much at meetings but our talking never
produce any action and deeds;
5. Some people who attend committee meetings are very
irresponsible and do not do their duties;
6. Figure heads in the organisation &re seen as the organisation;
?, House meetings do not take place; we seem not to be talking to
other people except those that we know. Our duty is to go out
to the people,
8. We also need to know each other.
The analysis recommended setting up an office, issueing member-ship cards,
creating different "departments' and decentralising activities, and
reaching out to and organising new people C93. A second, similar analysis
bemoaned the absence of regular social contact between activists and
.- and above ell the lack of educational work:
There is no political hegemony or coherence. The organisation
sinre its launching has been working loosely, IbetB_was_no
This analysis argued that social and educational activities were needed to
strengthen KRO. n o ?
KRO had failed to build a popular political community in Kagiso, as the
above analyses acknowledged. The building of such a community would have
required (among other things) involving relatively conservative but
prominent or active township residents., and taking up their concerns. In
early J98^ one group of such residents in the new* Riverside section,
organised into a Riverside Residents Committee, Their grievances were
their particularly high rents *nd the poor quality of construction. The
committee viewed the problem as short-term and not 'political'* and they
sought to resolve it through the Kagiso Council. It was dominated by
especially well-educated members of the township 'middle-class'* and
allegedly had a 'middle-class ideological disposition'. &ot*e of the
leaders were wary of KRO (which they possibly saw at the time as being more
of a UDF branch than a local civic organisation), KRO seems to have made
little attempt to either take up the issues or accomodate the committee
(and several leading members could not even recall it when intervewed in
1989), The Riversde Committee fizzled out soon* however. C113
of thp* new township extensions buil t in thf? ear] y 19BCs *aced si n>\ \t*r
< resit 1ting -from the state insistence that such ae-vel aprner»t.& he
ing), and in several cases these gave rise to similarly short-
very localised residents committees, often dominated by people
working in management or the professions. Rarely however did the ••»•?*«
=.prt.inr.c comprise suqh a h i gh proportion of the township as in
Tt. i« i fiportant to locate the weakness of township organisation with, n td^
apprnnr i At*? structural context* and not to attribute to organiser s s.Cil e»
hi 1 i ty -for the? disorganisation. Furthermore, weak organ i sat ion, jr.
Bne-.n of -formal structures like KRO, was neither a necessary nor a
rip.-t reason for the? absence of popular mobilisation and politirai
=t . i> t-hj& Vaal Triangle, for example, formal organisatioo
^ri;/ wrak, J f not weaker- put there the issue of the rent,
t^-.F»r| widpsprpari mobilisation and protest, in which relatveiy
«-nr,c«rvativp residents participated alongside more self-consciously
iti"l militants. In KagiSO during 19B4 there was no such mobilising
Tn Mar-ch and April 1985 an issue aro^e which may have had ti.e potential to
fiiDbiHsp « wirip 'angf? of re«iripnt5 in protest. The Council had sent out.
Wir-O nnt-ire1;' to residents alleging that rna^sive arrears C of as much a-.-
pcjnO) Had been accumMl ateri,, since X3&\ in some cases. The-e notices were
not accompanied by any explanation, but a bizarre circular from thf? Mayor
was attached. The circular said- *Thank you for your loyal support of my
counci i and for keeping Kagiso calm in these troubled time? ' ! TJ.e reeisor.
behind the larrpgr5' seemed to be that, rents were increased, Arid t<ac kdat.e-d'
At public meetings residents called for a boycott of the 'increase', ano
mandated KRO to represent them to the? Council, KRO met with the* town
clerk, who was intr ansigent, but the 'arrears' were soon wr ittn*ti off and
attributed tn * computer error-'« C123 This campaign f ai 1 ed, however,, fco
increase popular involvement in other, loss urgent., activities. Thi s w«s
rlear frrtm the very low attendance at the workshop in May referred to
In the second ha I f of 19B5, isolated inci dents of violent protest be*gan to
occur. Tn the KPO Tr ial the pol ice rightly emphasised i;u»>f-:e i ncnients, anu
insisted that they had preceded the (unde>rtiabl e > escal at ion of repression
and resistenc? in (Cagiso and Munsievi 11 e? ah the end of the /eat . Bui: what,
they fai1eri to recognise is the qualitative shif t between the^e pr e~
T)erefrthe»r iricydent=. and hhe po^t-Df?cembt?r community resistence. The t?arl ier
incidents ref 1 ected not a mabi 1 i T>€?d community but rather just the amorphous
phpnnmennri of * youth-' militancy.
The incident^ <=;«=?em to have begun with a So wet o Day coinrriemor ?*•(;. i on =it?rvic:e,
organserl by the UDF Arefl Committee, and attended by £00—700 peopl p. Af tc?r
the *er*/\c& particular buildings And vehicles were attacked. Two beerhalls
and four council lore' shops or houses were attacked, looted or burnt.
Twelve people were subspqupnt 1 y charged wi th pubIi c violence- only two of
these were older than eighteen. C133
ous other incidents followed. In late July a bus was stoned, l:-he
so Liquor Store was burnt out, and there was an attempted arson attack
on Ma«vupats*?l a High School. On 1 August a bus wss stoned >:< Munsievi 1 1 e*.
Ruse* wprp atoned on several ocasions in Kagiso in late August, and a
delivery vehicle? was burnt out. In September, buses were stoned on three
nnc;, *nri the Ksgi so Senior Secondary School was petrol -bombpd. In
Prtober , a councillor's house was petrol—bombed and on one d#y s«?v>'
wpr-p F.toned. Buses were stoned on six further ocas ions in 1 ate
.HT>H November. At the end of November, one house was petrol —bo
unsuccessful attempt was made on a second house. C143
o-f these incidents should not be exaggerated, hont-ver. It S ^
that the situation could be controlled by local police. Most incidents
i nvol vpri stnrting buses, but the bus service was continued, and nucist of
incidents involved just one bus being stoned. The incidents did not
invni vr* =» wide range o-f residents. It seems that the so-c.*l I »=d 'youth'
were r-«*pnns j bl e, al though there does not appear to be any rnurt or
rlncun.*»ritary evidence pnabl ing us to more precisely chai dCttrise the
participants. Nor was there sustained rnobi 1 isatic-n ovpr parti cut i*r i
Only in the schools was there any sign o-f this developing, with sl-ud^
demand i rig an SRC, the abol i t ion o-f corporal pun ishrnent, and the 3 mp.
o-f thr* library C153. Even student protests seem to have been piecemeal anci
1 i ru i t <?d .
U«ri«?r 1 /i ng the?*- incidents was a process o-f vyouth" mobiUsation. In the
earl )• t^BO^, KRO had never developed or r&l ied on a taass youth base,
i.n to one art i vist, 'the youth was very much inactive dur ing
p g ^ * ; in thp» cnrnrnurii ty' - In flay 1985 KRQ records not. ed of yc~K.ith
organisation that Mhere are potentials but lack of organ J "sat i ovi is having
a role of •frustration anrt confusion1 Tsio:] C1GU- Di»r ing ldSS the youth
became increasingly active, and ironically this wa=? in part the result of
art.Wifcie-" organised by the Kag> so Council . 1985 was Internat ional Youth
Year , av.d in Kagiso the Council sought, to appropr iate the occa^-i on hy
organising t-heir own youth activities (which initially ovei -si• ado-Mod the
weak fare offered hy KRO). These youtl.« - or to be more- pi^cise, students
- grew increasirgl y discontented with the Count, j 1 , howevpr. When
disanpni nting examination results became- known, many rioted maoy later got.
involved in the Youth Congrosses, C17J
Thf? irient i tv of the * youth*1 remains conceptual I y a= wr 1 " as empir it A\ 1 y
unrlear. At the time the label was widely used to classif;. peopu- involved
in violent protects (regardless of .*gt?) and were not involved in for-wal or
discipl inri organisation < in polemical contrast fco the 'woi kers' ». CUarly
most people engaged in township riots were young, and in fact younger ancj
younger residents became increasi^l-/ dominant- in such inci J^ rit-i. But it.
remains very unrlear when and whore hhe "*youth " were boycott 1 -^ 3 students,
school dr-pouts, young w.irkprs, or unemployed residents (o-f varying ages),
yet *1 one what kiprts of informal social organisation char =»cter iser! the^ rn.
This topic is currently being addressed in a number of other research
projects TtBI, and T regret that I cannot provide clarification of the
situation in Ka^isn,
KRO dd not- r^^pond to the esral at ion of violence at al I decisivel y. MI- th
t imp the orc-ani sat i on was becoming increasingl y divided over the- direct i on
it should t-flke. S O W P KPQ leaders argued that the priority should (:.«
MObi 1 icing p^npl R . tak ing 'up national isr>ue? in the bel ifcf that invol vernen
in nptinnal rarfip^ igr>^  would lead to local, ir.obi 1 i saton ant- organ i nation.
Other artivi^ts i r. KPO argued that the pr i ori t •/ should be deepening
nrganjsatiori. establishing local comrnittees (possibl/ at t.K-e level ai f'he
street> and thus providing the structures for increasing populAr
part icipat i on. It was A mistake, they suggested, to confuse mob i 1
wth organisation, particularly where slightly different constituencies were
involved- Some members of the former group accepted in principle the need
to deepen organisation, but not in practice. Inevitably, perhaps, the
strategic arguments became bound up with personal disputes. The
established leadership of KRO increasingly began to caucus Nithout their
critics. This division sapped KRO's ability to constructively direct the
growing militany of the so-called *youth', and paved the way for the
calling of consumer boycotts. C193
In December 1985 Kagiso experienced its first major political campaign of
the mid 1980s, with a consumer boyccott. The boycott was itself a major
art of defiance, but more importantly, it set in motion a train of
developments which led to the emergence of a radical and defiant political
community in Kagiso.
The declaration of a consumer boycott resulted from two, related
influences. The first was the regional dimension, with the growth of the
UDF on the West Rand, and the declaration of consumer boycotts as a
regional pol.itical initiative. The second was the local dimension, with
the militancy of the *youth' generating pressures for a more concerted
organisational response by the older activists. These two influences were
linked through particular individuals. In general, the activists with good
regional links were those with some authority among the ^youth', .
The UDF had not, during 1983-84, been particularly strong or active in the
Transvaal. During this time the UDF had concentrated on its campaigns
against the Koornhof Bills and the Tricameral Parliament, culminating in
its campaigns against elections to the Houses of Representatives and
Delegates in August 1984. These campaings, of course, were concentrated in
^coloured-1 and indian areas, most of which were in the Cape and Natal
respectively. The Million Signatures Campaign was not a success in the
Transvaal. The UDF was characterised by what has been called *roadshow-
style mobilisation* C2O3. During 1984-1984 the UDF largely neglected those
issues which were at the centre of township politics in the *black'
townships of the P.W.V.. A planned national conference of civic
organisations was repeatedly postponed, and the UDF head office, in
Johannesburg, was taken by surprise by the Vaal Uprising!
During late 1984, and particularly 1985, however, the UDF presence and
strength in P.W.V. townships increased rapidly. Civic organisations which
had previously stood at a distance from the UDF, most obviously the Soweto
Civic Association, affiliated. New affiliates sprung up in diverse
townships. Important events (starting with the November 1994 regional
stay-away) and campaigns were organised by key UDF affiliates in
conjunction with other organisations. These developments were reflected in
the UDF's theme for 1985' 'From Protest to Challenge, Mobilisation to
Organisation**, and the broadening base for the Transvaal UDF was reflected
in the new Regional Executive Committee elected at the Transvaal AGM in
March.
The main reason for the increasing strength of the UDF was simply the
widespread mobilisation, protest, and local organisational development in
individual townships from mid 1984. In the P.W.V., this fed into
identification with and support for the UDF. However, some regional
leaders called for a broadening and escalation of protests and campaigns.
At a *flster rate than the developing organisational capacity of local-level
structures, A key tactic which such regional leaders sought to deploy was
the consumer boycott.
The tactic o-f the consumer boycott had its recent origins in the early
1980s in product- or firm-specific boycotts in support of striking workers.
In mid l^SP a new form of consumer boycott was developed in the Eastern
Cape- blanket boycotts of businesses owned by whites and black
^collaborators'. Whereas the previous boycotts had generally been
organised around workplace issues, the 1985 boycotts were organised around
an ambiguous combination of long-term and national political issues, on the
one hand, and local and immediate <generally non-workplace) issues on th&
other. Boycott organisers were often motivated by an exaggerated belief in
the national political efficacy of boycotts. C213
Outside of the Eastern Cape there was often a serious lack of
organisational planning and preparation for the boycotts, and the boycotts
therefore* gave rise to a number of grave political problems. In both
Johannesburg and Pretoria, consumer boycotts called in August J985 were
primarily organised'at the local level by the so-called *youthJ - meaning
those younger township residents who ^supervised' the boycott at bus and
taxi ranks and in the township's streets, enforcing compliance. The term
*comtsotsi' seems to have come into use at about this time. The press
tended to exaggerate the frequency of forced oil—drinking and grocery
confiscation, but there were without doubt too many such incidents.
Underlying both the enthusiasm for consumer boycotts and the organisational
problems was the militancy of the so-called *youth'« Al 1 over the country
large numbers of young residents were drawn into direct action against the
state, but without apparent organisational discipline or ideological
coherence. In Kagiso, KRO had a *youth department' which served as a youth
congress until the Munsieville and Kagiso Youth Congresses (MuYCO and
KaYCO) were independently established in late 1965, In late 1985 KaYCO
allegedly had about seven hundred slgned-up members/ and MuYCO about three
hundred. But the structures of the Youth Department and Youth Congresses
only provided for minimal organisational disipline, and many "youths' were
not even nominal members of these structures. C223
In Kagiso, the call for a consumer boycott was first made in August 19B5.
It seems that this call fell flat, and the boycott never really took off.
As a KRO leader later admitted, *we shouldn't have tried to do it; it was
the wrong way to do it' C233. In December a new consumer boycott, from 3
to 31 December, was announced at a series of public meetings. C24J
The consumer boycott in Kagiso.and Munsieville was clearly part of a
regional campaign. The consumer boyott tactic "was spreading like a
prairie fire' <as one activist put it) C253. The Witwatersrand and
Pretoria consumer boycotts were to begin again around 8 December. A
leading KRO activist, Sister Bernard Ncube, had herself spoken at the
funeral of victims of the liamelodi Massacre, where she called on mothers to
support boycotts: *The consumer boycott is the only weapon with which to
fight evil structures that take people's lives.' C263
A Krugersdorp Consumer Boycott Cammittee (KCBC) was formed. Th is comprised
about forty people from KRO, the Women's Organisation (KWO), the African
Chamber of Commerce (Kafcoc), the youth congresses, and even AZAPO and
AZANYU- The KCBC was concerned with ^publicity, education, and organising
house-to-house calls to explain to people what the consumer boycott was all
about'. C27]
There was some opposition to the calling of a consumer boycott even in
December. Although the details are disputed, it seems that one group of
activists argued that there had been inadequate prior preparation- They
claim that they refused to support the call.
Some? of the guys felt it was not yet time to call a consumer
boycott. Let us call a meeting and educate the people. They
were not anti-boycott as such. It was the approach, the manner
of introducing the boycott.
The critics also argued that the boycott should involve concrete and
realistic demands, rather than grand national ones C2S3. KCBC leaders,
however, claim that there was extensive prior organisation, and that the
so-called critics had in fact expressed support C293. I remain unconvined,
however. Whether or not there was prior criticism, the boycott did lead to
major organisational problems. For one thing, if KRO lacked good grass-
roots organisation, the KCBC was even more isolated from Kagiso residents.
The critics within KRO were excluded from the KCBC. Furthermore (these
critics allege) township businessmen, whose cooperation was obviously
sought, by the KCBC ended up almost running the boycott. C303
In the first week of the consumer boycott there was widespread harassment
of people who had briken the boycott by shopping in town. According to KRO
secretary and KCBC spokesman, Laurence Ntlokoa<
... at the beginning a whole lot of people who did not belong to
any particular organisation and who had not called the boycott
itself, started intimidating people, confiscating people's
parcels and that type of problem. And we have realised this
about two days after that things were not going right. C313
And KRO chairman Joe Makgotlho admitted'
During the couse of the first week after the commencement of the
said boycott, there was harassment, intimidation, and generally
unruly behaviour by youths, acting against adults whom they
believed to be breaking the boycott. C323
A number of non-activist township residents gave evidence on this
intimidation in court. A 42 year-old nursing assistant front Munsieville
wa<5 herself the victim of a search. She was asked why she had supported
the boycott:
It is because one day, whilst I was from town, I was in a taxi.
Some boys searched my bag, saying they were looking for things
that were bought in town and that they did not want us to buy in
town... I was afraid of them, because if they find you have
bought, some items in town, they destroy them. They throw them
all over the show.
The boycott, had been supported, she said, 'because o-f fear'. However, she
herself had never seen or heard of anyone being forced to eat groceries,
and she had never actual 1y «een any purchases being destroyed C33D.
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Another 42 year-old from flunsieville gave a contrasting picture, however.
She* asserted that lwe are not afraid of the "comrades"* , and denied
(despite persistent cross-examination) that there had been .any systematic
intimidation. She explained popular support for the boycott in terms of
widespread hostility to Krugersdorp's white residents. A possible
explanation of this witness's dismissal of intimidation is that it only
occurred during the first week of the boycott. Later, and particularly
with escalating repression, there emerged alternative reasons -for
enthusiastically supporting the boycott. C343
Thorp were also reports of intimidation in the press. On 13 December the
Star: quoted another *Kagiso resident' •
Youths as young as fourteen stop taxis and private cars coming
from town. They destroy groceries found in the vehicles and in
some cases assault those who refuse to hand over their goods.
Where in the world have you seen youths as young as twelve making
decisions? Can one expect any direction from such youths? C353
As this last quotes illustrates, the brutal enforcement of compliance with
the boycott was politically divisive. Such a situation was not confinea to
Kagiso. In Alexandra, for example, the over-zealous enforcement of
consumer boycotts was one of the grievances which residents inreasingly
voiced during April and May 19B6.
KRO/KCBC leaders expressed unhappiness with the intimidation in the first
week. According to Ntlokoa, they had to do something ^because it was a
problem for us as well Cas for the victims! because it was not our idea of
a consumer boycott *  C36J. One KRO committee member (Bongani Dlamini) saw
youths searching through a woman's parcels, and intervened. The Human said
she had not known about the boycott as she was not from Kagiso. According
to Dlamini --
Then I told the youths, I said to them, come, this is not the way
to operate. Leave her, let her have her things, because you
should teach people the reason of not buying in town, rather than
destroying the things they have already purchased. C373
The boycott organisers called a meeting with the youth congresses.
According to Ntlokoa, the meeting vreally gave this problem a brainstorm
and we realised that the problem here was really caused by criminal
elements who were trying to take advantage of the situation by confiscating
people's goods' C383.
KRO decided to run a *crime-prevention' campaign. Initially this was aimed
at people violently enforcing the boycott, 'to give these people manners'
C393. The KCBC stated that violence against boycott-breakers would not be
tolerated> and disassociated itself from
... hooliganism and criminal behaviour perpetrated by people
claiming to be our members enforcing and monitoring the boycott
... If unruly elements do not stop their irresponsible actions,
they shall be dealt with thoroughly.
On Friday evening we received information that some hooligans
were now using the name of the committee for their own ends. Me
apprehended the people responsible and reeducated them about the
need for an orderly and not a violent consumer boycott. On
II
Saturday we again received information that some criminal
elements had hijacked taxis. The group was apprehended and
owners o-f the taxis were called to identify them- They
apologised and were also reeducated. We warn that if unruly
elements do not stop their irresponsible actions, they shall be
dealt with thoroughly. C4O3
According to a KCBC statement, progressive vigilante groups had been set up
'to root out. criminal elements who intimidate and rob motorists, shebeen
owners and taxi-drivers in the name of the struggle', and such 'criminals'
had already been punished and lectured, and cash and goods recovered. C413
In their public statements the KCBC attributed the violence to 'hooligans',
'criminal elements'* outside of the progressive organisations. In practice
the distinction between members and non-members, and between members and
'hooligans-* was never so clear. The disciplining applied to members and
non-members. Only in so far as the violence was not intended by the KCBC
leaders, were all the so-called hooligans acting outside of the township
organisations. In interviews, a KCBC leader said that there had been a
lack of clarity about the aims of the boycott C423- This allowed militant
residents the opportunity to brutally enforce the boycott end at the same
time genuinely believe that they were doing so in the name of the struggle.
A second strand to the crime-prevention campaign was raids on shebeens and
the confiscation of dangerous weapons. KRO and youth congress members
would go into shebeens in particular, because that seemed to be
the main problem area, and would confront whoever- was in the
house and explain to them that knives were dangerous weapons and
that, anybody who had come there, had come to enjoy themselves*
and they must put knives on the table, and usually there would be
an education as to why it is not necessary for people to kill
each other, stab each other. And people would volunteer to put
those knives on the table. C433
The police later found a large collection of these knives in a raid on the
Catholic convent in Kagiso.
The anti-crime campaign was widely seen to be a big success in terms of
reducing crime in the township. It would also seem to have been successful
in reducing the violent enforcement of the boycott* According to Ntlokoa,
the campaign 'eliminated the menace of the so-called comrade tsotsis', and
they ^collected hundreds of knives from these impostors' C44J. Another
resident recalls that 'it was the first time we recorded an incident-free
festive season' C453. The campaign led to more extensive involvement in
popular justice, which I shall discuss below.
What, is pertinent to emphasise here is the effect of the crime-prevention
campaign on township politics. Inadequate organisation had led to
widespread violent enforcement of the consumer boycott, which would have
generated massive animosities had it been allowed to continue unchecked.
The crime-prevention campaign not only halted the political damage already
done, but also constituted an extension of the socially-useful role Df the
progress!v<? organisations in Kagiso, providing for more sustained and
widespread political support and mobilisation, and the forging o-f an active
political community -
In January the consumer boycott was extended and a bus boycott was called,
A variety r»f reasons for these were given on different occasions, but there
to b*? consensus that the reasons were a combination of local-
ate ^nd national issues. Among the latter were the unbanning of
*hc» li-fting o-f the State of Emergency- and the unbaoning of Winnie
s. Vpry specific demands were made of the local bus company.,
Gr«?yhnupri Bus Lines (GBL). These included demands that GBL provided free
transport for school-chiIdren and pensioners on pay-out day* and ploughed
bae> some of its profits ino the community. Two further reasons were
widely given for the extension of the boycott to cover GBL = the company had
t.p help transport mourners at a political funeral in December, and
e* and vigilantes had used GBL buses in some of their raids in the
townships. C463
The combination of issues seems to have reflected a recognition that
national political slogans were rather divorced from the issues that many
residents saw as immediately pressing- A popular boycott required the
raising of at least some popular grievances. At the same time, popular
•support for the boycotts was clearly growing, and coercion played a
diminishing role in their continuation C473. A major factor in this was
the escalation of brutal state respression.
Tn December, ie the first month of the boycott, repression remained
relatively limited- Amidst widespread detentions of boycott-related
leaders in the region in mid December (including Jabu Ngwenya, chief
spokesperson for the Soweto CBC), fourteen KRO and KAYCO members were
detained, but these did not include the major leaders. The shooting dead
by police of a 34 yeai—old man who had allegedly been involved in enforcing
the boycott, and a few incidents of white vigilantes beating up residents
in Krugersdorp and Kagiso served, however, to generate increased support
for the boycott of white shops.
Repression escalated rapidly in early 1986. On 15 January a meeting of
Tsonga-speakers in Tsakane section was broken up by police. The meeting
had been called to discuss Tsonga-language schools, and most of the people
in attendance were elderly and conservative. But the meeting was convened
by a former councillor, and was to be addressed by KRO leader Dlamini about
the consumer and bus boycotts. Such police action radicalised small
sections of the more passive and conservative township population.
In an attempt to break the bus boycott/ the police and army manned
roadblocks at the entrance to Kagiso, and searched taxis and private
veh i c1es:
They would go through the car with a fine toothbrush to see
whether it had any mistake, the lights were working; people were
taken off and they checked papers; and this delayed, one taxi
would take about twenty to thirty minutes and the next one that
comes along the same thing happenned; if it was wrong they just
put it on the side and impounded it, and the buses were standing
just next to the roadblock; ... people were really stranded ...
because they were just stopped there, and they, some ... were
actually forced into those buses. The private cars, they were
only allowed one driver in a private carj they didn't allow
passengers at all. [483
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Acrording to the pol ice, 204 admission o-f guilt fines were paid during
January and February, indicating the scale of the clampdown. C493
Newspapers corroborated the above account of harassment, and reported that
police dispersed ^youths' who were ordering queues at taxi ranks. Several
Kagisn leaders were detained, and mass meetings were broken up. Police and
SADF used increasing force in their activities. In late January a shop
assistant was shot during a police raid on a supermarket. Five other
residents were killed during the month. One, a 14 year-old girl , was shot
at a students* meeting- KRO leaders had addressed the meeting., and tried
to persuade the students to return to school and organise SRCs, rather than
just housing'. Thirty heavily-armed police arrived, swore at Sister
Bernard and Ntlokoa, fired teargas into the hall and sjambofcked students as
they escaped through windows. The meeting, the police said, had been
illegal. C5O3
The escalating brutality of repression led to KRO leaders bringing an
urgent court application for an interdict restraining the police and army.
The application was launched on 13 February. In his founding affidavit for
the application, Makgothlo said that1
... members of the Police and the Defence Forces have regularly
and consistently been committing and continue to commit acts of
violence and harassment towards members of the communities of
these townships, and their private and communal property.
The security forces'" conduct, he claimed/ 'displays a disturbing disregard
for law and order' C513. The police and SADF submitted answering
affidavits, claiming that security force operations were entirely warranted
by the escalating unrest in Kagiso and Munsieville, and the case went to
court. Considerable evidence was brought testifying to police and 5ADF
brutality before the court case was interrupted when the applicants (the
KRO leaders) were detained - by the police! The case had to be postponed,
and was never resumed and concluded. This curtailment of the case suggests
that, the police had little confidence that they would be exonerated by the
court.
Massive and brutal repression caused outrage in the townships. The
evidence in the KRO Trial of residents who had never before been involved
in political organisations, testifies to the hostility which resulted from
witnessing incidents of police brutality. Residents became more
sympathetic to and supportive of protests, especially the consumer and bus
boycotts, which were seen as hitting the real perpetrators of violence in
the township. As one middle-aged woman said in court (under cross-
examination by the police lawyer)1
How do people buy front white shops whilst these white people are
mishandling us... In other words, what I mean is, they come into
the location, shoot at people, shoot at us with teargas, kill our
children, and then still we have to use our own money for them,
that is. for the whites. C52J
KRO leaders agree that, without the massive state repression, the consumer-
boycott would probably have been divisive.! the repression helped to forge
the necessary solidarity C533. The second factor in forging heightened
solidarity was the constructive response of KRO and other township
organisations. The crime-prevention campaign - discussed above - was the
first activity of this kind. That campaign combined with the intensified
repression by the state, which itself led to hostility and alienation from
state structures4 to provide the space for the development o-f extra-state
courts in the township. These were to be epitomise the new relationship of
township organisations with the broader community, indicating both the
strengths and the limits to that relationship.
The crime-prevention campaign led to further involvement in popular-
justice. Whilst initially the campaign had been concerned with the
specific problem of countering the boycott-enforcement problem, this itself
could not be easily distinguished from a broader project or general crime-
prevention. Such a project was very clearly socially useful, As Ntlokoa
grandly put it, they became involved in ^making the life o^ the people more
bearable, because the problem of criminals was a real problem that affected
everybody and people could not walk at night', CS43
In mid-January a ''Disciplinary Committee' (DC) was set up, initially as a
forum for disciplining young people caught in the crime-prevention
campaign. The DC was later identified by the police as a "people's court",
although it never applied that term to itself. Their emphasis was on re-
education* and corporal punishment was limited (and subject to the approval
of parents or other family members). The DC was chaired by KRO executive
member Dlamini, and its other members were also young activists in their
20s, C55]
About three weeks after the DC had been set up, Dlaroini resigned as
chairperson at a meeting with older residents. Numerous residents had been
urged the DC to extend its role beyond cases arising out o-f the crime-
prevention campaign, and in particular to mediate in domestic and other
petty disputes, Dlaroini felt that he was not old enough to preside over
such cases. At the meeting older residents volunteered to take over the
^court' - the new chairperson was a 54 year-old - and it became involved in
civil and family disputes. C563
One case dealt with by the court concerned a local builder accused of using
too little cement when he built a stose -for a woman.
... the stoep was cracking and then that man said Cthat he3 felt-
like not repairing the stoep, and then the DC asked him, told
him, you know, in a manner, look, you are the one who built the
stoep. So, now, if it is cracking, it means you did not mix well
from the cements and the likes. So, you have to fix it. And
then he saw ... that it really is true, because he is the one who
was making the stoep.
The DC decided that it was his responsibility C573- Many cases concerned
family rows. Marital disputes were common/ as were parent-child disputes-
According to one Munsieville resident1
My mother once took a complaint to Cthe court] about my younger
sister. f.Four unarmed comrades3 came to the house and called my
mother and my younger sister. They then said to my mother , will
you please tell us the story you told us before about your
daughter, so that- she must hear what you were complaining about.
The complaint was that my sister had got a child and she is
neglecting the child- She would go about- in the township,
leaving the child alone at home. Then trny sister3 said yes, what
my mother said was correct. And then she said the reason why she
was doing this was because the father to that child resides at
K?giso and the father would come and take her along to Kagiso and
bring her back late. They said to her, she should see to it that
sh*3 does not do that again, because if she did that again, they
would not come again to talk to her, they would come and
discipline her and give her a hiding on her haunches, C583
Other nnn-activists gave similar accounts. According to A 42-yeai—old
woman, the court was *a committee which corrects people of their faults or-
of their mistakes.,. It appeared as though it was a good committee which
wa«* goort for our children' C593. A former Kagiso Councillor witnessed a
court, session wher*3 an old man was reprimanded for beating his wife, and
warned that he would be 'dealt with' if he did it again. C6O3
DC in Kagiso and Munsieville thus developed into a ^people's court--' of
the type that was common in townships C613. It was concerned with civil
and family disputes, enjoyed considerable popular support, and was presided
over by older residents, many of whom came from the churches. The court
was popular because it was both practical, in the sense of being
functional,- and was very loosely accountable (at least in comparison with
the state courts). KRO attracted support as a result of its involvement in
the courts.
The courts were not without their critics, however. Criticisms focussed on
questions of court, procedure, and particularly on the prevalence of
corporal punishment and overly-summary proceedings. Some of the
participants in the courts were allegedly former ^blackjacks' <ie municipal
policemen) and former criminals, including even rapists. The courts were
sometimes *overindulgent', and biased in favour of the complainants. C623
The combination of brutal state repression and constructive initiatives on
the part of radical township organisations generated a broad political
community. Without very extensve interviewing it is impossible to say
quite how broad this community was - an obvious question is whether or how
much it extended across the post-1981 extensions to the township. The
available evidence does suggest, however, that the community was
wiidespread.
The concept of 'community' is widely overused in disussions of township
politics. If spatial fetishism is avoided, 'communities' can only exist'in
terms of the consciousness of their members. Few townships, or even parts
of townships, comprise communities in any active sense. Within townships
there certainly ^re particular communities - religious, social, sometimes
work-based, and sometimes political - but these are generally limited to
particular spheres of activity, involving different (but overlapping)
fractions of the townships' populations.
The forging of active political communities <or mass movements) was a key
feature of politics in many townships in the early 19B0s. The issues of
rents, township development, education, and local government - ie issues
that had a real local importance - were the key buildng blocks of these
political communities. Primarily national political concerns, whilst
undoubtedly very important to township residents, did not serve as
lising factors in the construction of local political communities.
The experience of Kagiso in late 1983 shows how a concern Nth national
political campaigns can, in particular circumstances, be very damaging to
the construction of a political community. A major goal of the national
and regional consumer boycotts was to mobilise township residents, but the
particular manner in which boycotts were sometimes enforced (as in Kagiso)
h^ fj «n initially counter—productve effect. It is possible that a
cnerrXvf?\y-enforced consumer boycott could achieve other goals
(pressurising white traders* for example), but even this is doubtful as it-
is unlikely that boycotts could be maintained for suffiently long without
legitimacy.
£ political community was forged in Kagiso in spite of the initial manner
of organising the boycott. State repression generated a certain amount of
solidarity in the township* and (more specifically) intense hostility to
the essentially white ^system', particularly the police but also white
traders in Krugersdorp. Local repression thus made an intialiy non-local
and divisive boycott campaign into a locally important campaign c-f protest
and defiance. The involvement of radical township organisations io routine
township dispute settlement* although not unproblematic, helped to
reinforce the radical orientation of the emergent political community C633,
ThF apparently widespread popular enthusiasm for the consumer and bus
boycotts, and for KRO generally, in early 1986 reflected this radical
political community.
The reproducton of political communities - perhaps more so than other typos
of community - remains contingent on the surrounding conditions. There is
nothing immutable about such communities. In Kagiso, brutal repression was
the key factor in forging the community, and the very success of KRO in
restraining the police (as a result of the publicity, as no formal court
order was ever granted) undermined the continued importance of this factor.
Lacking solid organisational structures, the combination of the detention
of leaders (which reduced the possibility of new initiatives), township
development, and a the continued threat of repression led to popular
demobilisation. The boycotts dragged on with little fresh impetus. The
bus service was finally withdrawn from Kagiso, and the consumer boycott-
petered out. With the repression of the 'peoples' courts" and whatever
organisational discipline there had been, and the diminishing immediate
importance of political adversaries, many of the comrades of 19B5-86 became
the tsotsis of the late 1980s.
The failure of KRO to resolve ^ar even debate) the organisational disputes
of 1985 can now be seen as a key failure C643, Former KRO activists
acknowledge at least some of the problems of 1985-1986. T^e leading
activist at the time now recognises that politics was too leader-oriented
and too issue-oriented even during 1985-1986. Issues and campaigns were
identified with particular leaders.; their detention therefore led to
organisational paralysis C653. The political community of early 1986 was
fragile, and, we can see with the benefit of hindsight., short-lived.
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